Synopsis of Husserl’s Lectures I-III

The natural attitude is distinct from the philosophical attitude in that the critique of knowledge is found in the philosophical attitude. Knowledge, in the natural attitude, is given to us in various modes, e.g., perception, intuition, memory and the like. Our judgments of the world are made in this attitude from direct experience. We can infer, generalize, analyze and deduce new generalizations from this general knowledge. Without question, there are contradictions in the knowledge that we experience, however Husserl asserts that incorrectly perceived knowledge is canceled by assured knowledge. When contradictions in knowledge appear, we proceed to assess the grounds and the various possibilities for explaining the matter; and the weaker must give way to the stronger. The difficulties and contradictions that arise are resolved through logic or by an appeal to the facts. It is through this continual explaining and examination of knowledge that the natural sciences make progress. It is within the philosophical attitude that we reflect on the possibility of knowledge; knowledge that is taken for granted in the natural attitude and the relationships between knowledge and the object. Knowledge is a natural state of affairs, psychological facts, mental experience and experiences from a known organic being. Knowledge is according to its essence, knowledge of objectivity, by virtue of a sense that is immanent  and the sense that it relates to objectivity. Nevertheless, the problem of the possibility of knowledge is founded in the correlation between epistemic experience, meaning and the object. The riddle, that Husserl posits, is how can knowledge be sure of its agreement with the known object and/or go beyond itself to reach its objects reliably? All of these perceptions and grasping of knowledge belong to “a being”. How does the knowing subject know for sure that these acts of knowing exist and what they know exist? Logic also becomes a problem when we use it for examination of knowledge; for it, also, is contingent upon the human species and is a part of the natural evolution of man. Therefore, logic cannot be absolute, but relative. The relativity of logic enhances the riddle. Epistemology and metaphysics is concerned about the absurdities and contradictions found in knowledge. They inquire into the essence of knowledge. Epistemology, then, becomes the critique of positive knowledge and gives an accurate and definitive interpretation of the results of the positive science with respect to what exists. Only epistemological reflection yields the distinction between positive science and philosophy. Knowledge is interpreted in many ways, but it is metaphysics that is concerned with knowledge in the absolute sense, which grows out of a critique of knowledge, which is otherwise, the phenomenology of knowledge. This is the philosophical method. There is parity between the sciences and philosophy and even, more so, philosophy is related to all of the other sciences, and also upon the methodological model that secures them; but philosophy lies in a wholly new dimension with a wholly new departure. An important assertion that Husserl posits is, “how can the critique of knowledge establish itself if the entire world and its knowledge is to be doubted? How can we determine scientifically and objectively the essence of knowledge? As it places all knowledge in question, the critique of knowledge can not place its own knowledge in question. However, there is a knowledge that provides for itself and posits itself as primary. A Being is known in itself and is known in knowledge. Being is absolutely given insofar as it is given with complete clarity and indubitable. The Cartesian doubt asserts that I am certain of nothing; but when making this assertion, I realize that I am making this judgment and it would be absurd to persist in universal doubt. Every thing that I perceive, imagine, judge and infer is cogitatio. Knowledge is the title for a highly ramified sphere of being that can be given to us absolutely. This knowledge is given to me in as much as I reflect upon it, accept it and posit them in a pure act of seeing. Even vague talking, the phenomenon of vagueness, of such matters is, nonetheless, given. The reflective seeing within perception and imagination are equivalent. Husserl further states that every intellectual experience can be made into a pure object of seeing and this act of seeing is an absolute givenness, an existing entity, as a “this-there”. I am moving on absolute ground even when I wonder about what sort of being it is and how this mode of being is related to other beings. As we are seeing them, we can examine their essence, their constitution and their immanent character. He further states that this must be supplemented by a discussion of the concept of essence and the knowledge of essence through inter-subjectivity. The theory of knowledge is based on this sphere of absolute givenness. However, it is the critique of knowledge that seeks to clarify, to bring to light, the essence of knowledge and the legitimacy of its claims to validity. The critique of knowledge cannot begin without the pre-given. The immanence found in the evidence of the cogitatio is free of the enigmatic character which is the source of all skeptical predicaments; and therefore can serve as an appropriate point of departure for a critique of knowledge. The riddle continues for Husserl. Immanence is the necessary mark of all knowledge that comprises the critique, but there is a different type of immanence and transcendence in the natural and phenomenological attitudes. Real immanence is given in the genuine sense evident givenness, which can be directly seen. Transcendental immanence is absolute, clear givenness, self givenness in the absolute sense. Husserl further asserts that transcendence remains both the initial and guiding problem for the critique of knowledge. The riddle of this notion of the transcendent, i.e., the possibility for knowledge to make contact with something transcendent to it is “in how”. Knowing is something other than the known object. Knowing is given, but the known object is not given. Husserl believes that we have secured the entire sphere of cogitations, the phenomenology of knowledge itself and therefore free of the riddle. Husserl believes that there is a difference in pure phenomenology and psychological phenomenon. Perceptive experiences of the experiencing person is given, sensed, recognized and integrated within the perception of objective time. These experiences belong to the experiencing ego and are psychological facts and therefore, psychological phenomenon. It is through the phenomenological reduction does one acquire an absolute givenness that no longer offers anything transcendent. Could the pure phenomenon and the pure cogitatio be the transcendent that one is seeking in the reduction????  He says, “the perception thus grasped and delimited in “seeing” is then an absolute perception, devoid of every transcendence, given as pure phenomenon in the phenomenological sense”. It appears that the riddle is still there. However, to every psychological experience there corresponds, by way of the phenomenological reduction, a pure phenomenon that exhibits its immanent essence as an absolute givenness. At this point, we are no longer doing psychology, a positive science that takes it objects to be transcendent. We are investigating what exists and remains valid whether anything like objectivity really exists or not. What is purely immanent is to be characterized by the phenomenological reduction. Whether I question the existence of the transcendent object or the ability of the relation to make contact with it still contains something that can be apprehended with the pure phenomenon. Phenomenology of knowledge further defined as the theory of the essence of pure phenomena of knowing. For it is clear that those things that are known in science are scientifically grounded and universally grounded, but in fact are subjective, but may not have objectivity. Before the possibility of transcendence is demonstrated, no transcendent conclusion of epistemology is secure. However, what assures me of this givenness of knowledge is also to be found with Descartes in his assertions of clearness and distinctness in perceptions. Based on these two characteristics, we are bound to accept the givenness of knowledge. Husserl further states that the givenness of the cogitatio is absolute, but not the givenness of the external thing in outer perception. The possibility of a critique of knowledge depends on the indication of forms of absolute givenness other than the reduced cogitations.

Two moments of the phenomenological reduction:

Epoche is a procedure whereby we no longer accept the “captivation in accepted-ness”, i.e., freeing ourselves from the unquestioned acceptance of the everyday world

Reduction is the recognition of this acceptance