Kant and Pietism

The Practical Postulates, a Derivative of Rational Theology and Pietism

Guyer, The Cambridge Companion to Kant, describes Kant’s background as having been reared in a Pietist family and had a pietist education both at home and in school. They believed that the Christian faith was a living relationship with God and not a set of doctrinal propositions. One can postulate a dichotomy early on in understanding here that religion is an external to the body and a relationship with God is internal. Pietism was hostile to Christianity and stressed God’s grace as a transforming power in the lives of me. Pietism stressed the believer’s transformation of emotions reflected in outward behavior. Theoretical inquiry was secondary to the cultivation of piety and morality in life. It was similar to Lutheran orthodoxy because scriptural authority has primacy over natural reason and intellectual victories. Because of the importance of the invisible church and the priesthood of all believers, including the whole of humanity, one could theorize that Kant appreciated this notion of inclusiveness of humanity when he begins to think about the practical postulates (pg. 394).

The social and political tendencies of Pietism and rationalism were foes in the cultural life of the eighteenth century. Rational religion (deism), in contrast to Pietism, denied the need for supernatural revelation and founded religion on reason and rational morality. Rational religion attacks miracles, supernatural revelation, and biblical histories. If one defines religion as a set of beliefs and practices often centered upon specific supernatural and moral claims abut reality, the cosmos and human nature, it is rather distinct from Pietism. If we then define Pietism as a type of moral faith, we have an overlapping of moral faith, religion and rational theology. We understand how Kant uses his reason to combine these vectors to bring to us the practical postulates. Guyer states that Kant, a student Christian Wolf’ rational theology, became a critic of pietism and rational theology.

In Kant’s letter to J.C. Lavater (p. 396), he critiques pietisim by stating that what we  FREELY THINK  (our will, reason) is very different from our confession of faith, appeal to holy names and religious ceremonies. It is only in our final moments that our candor and hidden convictions come forth and it is our hope and trust in wonderful grace and mystery of God that we are able to take part in the divine supplement. Guyer’s interpretation of Kant’s rational theology is that the concept of God is natural to human reason (p.397). It is in response to “rational reflection on the concept of an individual thing in general”. Different things have different amounts of reality and differ qualitatively from each other.

The “ideal of pure reason”, the pure rational concept of a supremely perfect being or God is couched in Kant’s categories of quality (reality, negation and limitation). The principle of thorough determination states that only one member of contradictorily opposed predicates determines any given thing. The complete individual concept of a given thing consists of the precise combination of realties and negations. It is in this line of reasoning that we are, led to an all of reality or an individual possessing all realties, i.e., God. God is the ground of all possibility, a necessarily existent being, one who is a perfect being, extramundane, immutable, timelessly eternal, etc.

Kant draws a distinction between God’s ontological and cosmological or anthropological predicates. The ontological proofs are derived from the pure categories and the anthropological or cosmological are derived from the empirical features of the world. Kant’s theistic proofs follow from the view that God has a necessary existence and has a status in the root of all possibility. His theistic proofs are ontological, cosmological and physicotheological. These proofs are interrelated and necessary. Specifically, this interrelationship provides a proof for the existence of God. There is no ontological proof (pure reason) that can provide a proof for God’s existence. The other proofs are needed. Here, we gain insight into Kant’s development of the practical postulates. The theistic proof is not sufficient for God’s existence. His ontological proof is necessary, but his critique of it is “existence is not a real predicate, that is, it is not anything that could be added to the concept of a thing”, (p, 400). “Kant’s in effect mounts no criticism at all of the inference from contingent to necessary existence or the inference from purposiveness in the world to a wise designer”, (399).

According to Guyer, Kant gives a wonderful meaning to faith in contrast to faith. The propositions of knowledge are both sufficient objectively and objectively, whereas faith is subjective. He states that faith as much as knowledge is justified by reasons that are valid for everyone. Kant continues to insinuate the notion of inclusiveness for all beings. It is to be distinguished from opinion, which is insufficient subjectively as well as objectively. Kant continues to build a moral argument for the practical postulates one can justify a proposition by theoretical evidence and subjective considerations. This reasoning assists Kant in his moral argument for God. Kant speaks of the highest good, which is a morally obligatory end in addition to other ends that we may pursue in life that we believe that we can attain. This practical reason has two components; the moral good, which is virtue of character, and the natural good, which is happiness. They do not have equal moral weight, but he natural good is dependent upon the moral good. The two components of the highest good are perfect virtue and happiness proportional to virtue. The pursuit of these ends is necessary, but it is the pursuit of the moral good, the second component of the highest good depends on the existence of Providence.

As a man of religious thought, Kant was skeptical of religious culture, religious ceremonies and ecclesiastical authority. As a man of the enlightenment, Kant was concerned with science, morality and religion. There was no conflict between the three, but there was conflict of religious sensibility. Naturally, Kant preferred enlightened religious sensibility, which sought to reconcile religion with scientific reason. Some believe that the other sensibility remains prevalent where there is distrust for reason and prefer revealed tradition, mystical experience and enthusiastic emotionalism, (p 414). Kant is the moderate between the two extremes rejecting the religious sensibility that  that claim the entire sphere of religion which he believes is pretentious and rejects the other extreme secular view that view religion with contempt. He considers acknowledges the limits of reason, but there is no other source that might overrule it, (p.414).