Synopsis of Husserl’s
Lectures I-III
The natural
attitude is distinct from the philosophical attitude in that the critique of
knowledge is found in the philosophical attitude. Knowledge, in the natural
attitude, is given to us in various modes, e.g., perception, intuition, memory
and the like. Our judgments of the world are made in this attitude from direct
experience. We can infer, generalize, analyze and deduce new generalizations
from this general knowledge. Without question, there are contradictions in the
knowledge that we experience, however Husserl asserts that incorrectly
perceived knowledge is canceled by assured knowledge. When contradictions in
knowledge appear, we proceed to assess the grounds and the various
possibilities for explaining the matter; and the weaker must give way to the
stronger. The difficulties and contradictions that arise are resolved through
logic or by an appeal to the facts. It is through this continual explaining and
examination of knowledge that the natural sciences make progress. It is within
the philosophical attitude that we reflect
on the possibility of knowledge; knowledge that is taken for granted in the
natural attitude and the relationships between knowledge and the object. Knowledge
is a natural state of affairs, psychological facts, mental experience and
experiences from a known organic being. Knowledge is according to its essence,
knowledge of objectivity, by virtue of a sense that is immanent and the sense that it relates to objectivity.
Nevertheless, the problem of the possibility of knowledge is founded in the
correlation between epistemic experience, meaning and the object. The riddle, that Husserl posits, is how can
knowledge be sure of its agreement with the known object and/or go beyond
itself to reach its objects reliably? All of these perceptions and grasping of
knowledge belong to “a being”. How does the knowing subject know for sure that
these acts of knowing exist and what they
know exist? Logic also becomes a problem when we use it for examination of
knowledge; for it, also, is contingent upon the human species and is a part of
the natural evolution of man. Therefore, logic cannot be absolute, but relative.
The relativity of logic enhances the riddle.
Epistemology and metaphysics is concerned about the absurdities and
contradictions found in knowledge. They inquire into the essence of knowledge.
Epistemology, then, becomes the critique of positive knowledge and gives an
accurate and definitive interpretation of the results of the positive science
with respect to what exists. Only epistemological reflection yields the
distinction between positive science and philosophy. Knowledge is interpreted
in many ways, but it is metaphysics that is concerned with knowledge in the
absolute sense, which grows out of a critique of knowledge, which is otherwise,
the phenomenology of knowledge. This is the philosophical method. There is parity
between the sciences and philosophy and even, more so, philosophy is related to
all of the other sciences, and also upon the methodological model that secures
them; but philosophy lies in a wholly new dimension with a wholly new departure.
An important assertion that Husserl posits is, “how can the critique of
knowledge establish itself if the entire world and its knowledge is to be
doubted? How can we determine scientifically and objectively the essence of
knowledge? As it places all knowledge in question, the critique of knowledge can not place its own knowledge in question.
However, there is a knowledge that provides for itself and posits itself as
primary. A Being is known in itself and is known in knowledge. Being is
absolutely given insofar as it is given with complete clarity and indubitable.
The Cartesian doubt asserts that I am certain of nothing; but when making this
assertion, I realize that I am making this judgment and it would be absurd to
persist in universal doubt. Every thing that I perceive, imagine, judge and
infer is cogitatio. Knowledge is the
title for a highly ramified sphere of being that can be given to us absolutely.
This knowledge is given to me in as much as I reflect upon it, accept it and
posit them in a pure act of seeing. Even vague talking, the phenomenon of vagueness, of such matters is, nonetheless,
given. The reflective seeing within perception and imagination are equivalent.
Husserl further states that every intellectual experience can be made into a
pure object of seeing and this act of seeing is an absolute givenness, an
existing entity, as a “this-there”. I am moving on absolute ground even when I
wonder about what sort of being it is and how this mode of being is related to
other beings. As we are seeing them, we can examine their essence, their
constitution and their immanent character. He further states that this must be
supplemented by a discussion of the concept of essence and the knowledge of
essence through inter-subjectivity. The theory of knowledge is based on this
sphere of absolute givenness. However, it is the critique of knowledge that
seeks to clarify, to bring to light, the essence of knowledge and the
legitimacy of its claims to validity. The critique of knowledge cannot begin
without the pre-given. The immanence found in the evidence of the cogitatio is
free of the enigmatic character which is the source of all skeptical
predicaments; and therefore can serve as an appropriate point of departure for
a critique of knowledge. The riddle
continues for Husserl. Immanence is the necessary mark of all knowledge
that comprises the critique, but there is a different type of immanence and
transcendence in the natural and phenomenological attitudes. Real immanence is
given in the genuine sense evident givenness, which can be directly seen. Transcendental
immanence is absolute, clear givenness, self givenness in the absolute sense.
Husserl further asserts that transcendence remains both the initial and guiding
problem for the critique of knowledge. The riddle of this notion of the
transcendent, i.e., the possibility for knowledge to make contact with
something transcendent to it is “in how”. Knowing
is something other than the known object. Knowing is given, but the known
object is not given. Husserl believes that we have secured the entire sphere of
cogitations, the phenomenology of knowledge itself and therefore free of the
riddle. Husserl believes that there is a difference in pure phenomenology and
psychological phenomenon. Perceptive experiences of the experiencing person is
given, sensed, recognized and integrated within the perception of objective time.
These experiences belong to the experiencing ego and are psychological facts
and therefore, psychological phenomenon. It is through the phenomenological
reduction does one acquire an absolute givenness that no longer offers anything
transcendent. Could the pure phenomenon
and the pure cogitatio be the transcendent that one is seeking in the
reduction???? He says, “the
perception thus grasped and delimited in “seeing” is then an absolute
perception, devoid of every transcendence, given as pure phenomenon in the
phenomenological sense”. It appears that the riddle is still there. However, to
every psychological experience there corresponds, by way of the
phenomenological reduction, a pure phenomenon that exhibits its immanent
essence as an absolute givenness. At this point, we are no longer doing
psychology, a positive science that takes it objects to be transcendent. We are
investigating what exists and remains valid whether anything like objectivity
really exists or not. What is purely immanent is to be characterized by the
phenomenological reduction. Whether I question the existence of the
transcendent object or the ability of the relation to make contact with it
still contains something that can be apprehended with the pure phenomenon. Phenomenology
of knowledge further defined as the theory of the essence of pure phenomena of
knowing. For it is clear that those things that are known in science are
scientifically grounded and universally grounded, but in fact are subjective,
but may not have objectivity. Before the possibility of transcendence is
demonstrated, no transcendent conclusion of epistemology is secure. However,
what assures me of this givenness of knowledge is also to be found with
Descartes in his assertions of clearness and distinctness in perceptions. Based
on these two characteristics, we are bound to accept the givenness of
knowledge. Husserl further states that the givenness of the cogitatio is
absolute, but not the givenness of the external thing in outer perception. The
possibility of a critique of knowledge depends on the indication of forms of
absolute givenness other than the reduced cogitations.
Two moments of the
phenomenological reduction:
Epoche is a procedure whereby we
no longer accept the “captivation in accepted-ness”, i.e., freeing ourselves
from the unquestioned acceptance of the everyday world
Reduction is the recognition of
this acceptance